Difference between revisions of "Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Modulus Switching"

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This scheme proposed by Brakerski <ref='Brak'>Z. Brakerski, Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Modulus Switching from Classical GapSVP. In: Safavi-Naini R., Canetti R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012. CRYPTO 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7417. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_50 </ref> has a number of advantages over previous candidates such as [BGV]. In particular, it uses the same modulus throughout the evaluation process, so there's no need for modulus switching. Security of these scheme is baed on the hardness of the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lattice_problem GapSVP] problem.
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This scheme proposed by Brakerski <ref name='Brak">Z. Brakerski, Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Modulus Switching from Classical GapSVP. In: Safavi-Naini R., Canetti R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012. CRYPTO 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7417. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_50 </ref> has a number of advantages over previous candidates such as [BGV]. In particular, it uses the same modulus throughout the evaluation process, so there's no need for modulus switching. Security of these scheme is baed on the hardness of the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lattice_problem GapSVP] problem.
  
 
== Preliminaries ==
 
== Preliminaries ==

Revision as of 12:44, 18 January 2021

This scheme proposed by Brakerski [1] has a number of advantages over previous candidates such as [BGV]. In particular, it uses the same modulus throughout the evaluation process, so there's no need for modulus switching. Security of these scheme is baed on the hardness of the GapSVP problem.

Preliminaries

References

  1. Z. Brakerski, Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Modulus Switching from Classical GapSVP. In: Safavi-Naini R., Canetti R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2012. CRYPTO 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7417. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_50